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Abstract 
We examine the impact of an emission tax in a green market characterized by 
consumers’ environmental awareness and competition between firms for both 
environmental quality and product prices. The unique aspect of this model comes from 
the assumption that the cost for an increase in quality is fixed. We show that the 
emission tax improves welfare, thanks to a decline in pollution and despite an 
accentuation of product differentiation. The higher the marginal environmental damage 
is, the higher the optimal tax will be. The optimal tax, however, becomes lower than the 
marginal damage when the market is not too large. Finally, when marginal 
environmental damage is not too low, the optimal tax leads to a green product 
monopoly.  
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1. Introduction 
In its 2008 North America Environmental Report, Toyota, the car manufacturer, 
argues that they “spend an average of nearly $1 million an hour on research and 
development to develop the cars and technologies of the future. To maintain our global 
environmental leadership, we will redouble our efforts and substantially increase 
research and development spending over the next decade”. Toyota’s so-called Prius 
model, indeed, illustrates how research and development (R&D) is key to improving the 
environmental impact of a product. Similarly, eco-labeling products also result from 
R&D efforts of their manufacturers. In all these cases, fixed production cost increases 
with environmental quality, because R&D expenses are required to modify a production 
process that will generate less pollution. 
Two main reasons explain why some firms accept such additional cost. Firstly, 
increasingly stringent environmental policies require or encourage them to change their 
production processes in order to make them more environmentally friendly. The history 
of environmental policies in Europe since 1990 illustrates this point. European countries 
have been implementing green tax reforms since early 1990. Since 2005, the creation of 
a carbon market has also added new constraints on polluting companies. These 
economic instruments are complemented by many environmental standards. Secondly, 
the rise in the ecological consciousness of consumers has given firms the opportunity to 
increase their market share with green products. The 2008 Eurobarometer indicates that 
75% of the Europeans are “ready to buy environmentally friendly products even if they 
cost a little bit more” but that only 17% of them report having recently bought “products 
marked with an environmental label” (European Commission, 2008). 
In this paper, we focus on a specific environmental policy - an emission tax – and its 
capacity to encourage firms to improve the environmental quality of their product, when 
competing in a green market. We assume that consumers differ in their ecological 
consciousness and, thus, in their willingness-to-pay for environmental quality. Polluting 
firms choose their abatement effort and the associated environmental quality offered on 
the market as well as the price of their products. Social welfare is not only determined 
by the consumers’ surplus and the firms’ profits but also by the environmental damage 
caused by the manufacturing of the firms’ products, i.e. the negative externalities of 
pollution. 
Whereas under perfect competition, the optimal taxation is equal to the marginal 
environmental damage, imperfect competition leads the regulator to reduce the tax 
below this threshold.
1
 This is due to the necessity of taking into account the second 
market failure, imperfect competition, in addition to the first one, pollution externality. 
Barnett (1980) shows the link between the optimal tax and the price elasticity of 
demand in the monopoly case. Levin (1985), Ebert (1992), Requate (1993a, 1993b) and 
Simpson (1995) extend this result to a Cournot oligopoly in a market with 
homogeneous products. Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1995) prove on the contrary that 
the tax rate is higher than the marginal damage, when the number of firms corresponds 
to the second best optimum. Some articles address this question within the framework 
of vertical product differentiation. Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) introduces an emission 
                                                        
1
 For a recent survey, see Requate (2007). 
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tax in addition to an ad valorem tax and shows that the environmental tax is then equal 
to marginal environmental damage. This result is explained by the fact that a uniform 
commodity tax is equivalent to a lump-sum tax in her model, because of three 
fundamental assumptions: a consumer buys only one unit of the good or none; the 
market is fully covered; and quality increases marginal production cost. To the best of 
our knowledge, no article so far has tried to extend this result when environmental 
quality involves fixed costs of research and development (R&D). Poyogo-Theotoky and 
Teerasuwannajac (2002) study the credibility of a tax on emission coefficient by unit of 
production (and not on total emission) in a model with fixed quality costs. Within a 
similar framework, Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero (2002) study the effects of 
other environmental policies (unit emission standards, technology subsidies and product 
tax) on pollution and social welfare. We extend this analysis to an emission tax. 
We demonstrate the welfare-increasing effect of an environmental tax, which 
achieves a decrease in overall pollution. This conclusion contrasts with those of 
Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero (2002), who say that “aggregate emissions may 
increase as a result of government’s regulation, due to the strategic responses of the 
firms.” As expected, the optimal tax appears to be generally less than the marginal 
environmental damage. More surprisingly, this tax leads to a green monopoly when the 
marginal damage is not too low. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the model. In 
section 3, we study the game equilibrium and impact of the emission tax on equilibrium 
qualities and prices. In section 4, we analyze tax effects on welfare components in order 
to deduce its global effect and its optimal level. Section 5 brings the paper to a 
conclusion. 
2. The framework 
Consumers view lower pollution from product production and consumption as an 
environmental characteristic of a product, which increases product quality (all other 
features of the products being equal). All consumers prefer green products but they 
differ in their willingness to pay for them. Products can thus be differentiated by their 
environmental quality. According to models of vertical product differentiation 
developed by Mussa and Rosen (1978), Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Motta (1993), 
each firm produces one variant of a product and decides on its price. Each consumer 
buys one unit of the product or none. 
Consumer preferences are represented by a standard utility function u(q) defined by: 
 !
u(q) = r +qqi - pi (1) 
with r the consumer’s income (which is normalized to zero for simplification), q the 
ecological consciousness parameter which is uniformly distributed over 
 !
q,q!
[ ]
 with a 
unit density function,!qqi willingness-to-pay for quality qi and pi the price of the product 
i. 
Facing a “green” quality qh and a “brown” quality ql (
 !
qh > ql), the consumer with a 
parameter 
 !
˜ 
q!= pl ql  is indifferent between consuming the brown product at price pl or 
no product, and the consumer 
 !
ˆ 
q!= ph - pl( ) qh -ql( ) is indifferent between consuming 
the brown product ql at price pl or the green product qh at price ph. We assume that the 
Environmental tax in a green market  4 
market is not covered (
 !
q <
 ˜
q!), so that the demand for the brown product is 
 !
dl =
ˆ 
q!-
˜ 
q! 
and the demand for the green product is 
 !
dh =q!-
ˆ 
q!.
2
 
The firms’ production costs are assumed to be independent of quantity, strictly 
increasing and convex in quality, with the quadratic form 
 !
c qi( )=
1
2
cqi
2
. The ecological 
quality of the product i is defined by abatement 
 !
qi = e - ei , where 
 !
e  is the maximal 
pollution by each firm and ei pollution by firm i. Normalizing 
 !
e  to 1, we identify the 
environmental quality qi as the abatement effort, in percentage, made by the firm i.  
Quality is then defined over the interval 
 !
0,1
[ ]
. Moreover, we assume, in line with Arora 
and Gangopadhyay (1995), Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003), Moraga-González and 
Padrón-Fumero (2002), Motta and Thisse (1999) and Poyago-Theotoky and 
Teerasuwannajac (2002), that abatement is achieved through an R&D investment, so 
that the quality improvement requires a fixed cost. Our model thus distinguishes itself 
from the Lombardini-Riipinen’s one (2005). We consider that firms are subject to an 
emission tax te. Their profits are thus defined by: 
 !
p i = pi -teei( )di -c qi( )= pi -te 1-qi( )( )di -
1
2
cqi
2        i=l,h (2) 
We can establish a link between the emission tax and the unit tax as assumed by 
Delipalla and Keen (1992) and Pirtillä (1997): the emission tax can be broken down into 
a unit tax te and an abatement subsidy 
 !
t eqidi.  
The competition between firms takes place in a two-stage game. In the first stage, 
they decide on the environmental quality qi to produce. In the second stage, they choose 
prices pi. We examine the game equilibrium in the next section. 
3. The game equilibrium 
3.1 The price subgame 
The game is solved using backward induction in order to provide the subgame 
perfect equilibrium. In the second stage, firms compete in prices knowing the product 
qualities decided in the first stage. Maximization of the profit (2) with respect to price 
induces the following prices: 
 !
ph
*
=
2q!qh qh -ql( )+ t eqh 3- 2qh - ql( )
4qh - ql
pl
*
=
q!ql qh - ql( )+ t e 2qh + ql - 3qhql( )
4qh -ql
ì!
í!
ï!
ï!
î!
ï!
ï!
 (3) 
These prices lead to following demand functions: 
                                                        
2
 This assumption is usual in a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation with fixed cost for 
quality improvement. It assumes that the space between 
 !
q
 and 
 !
q!
 is sufficiently large. 
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 !
dh
*
=
2 q!+ t e( )qh - t e
4qh - ql( )
dl
*
=
qh q!+ t e( )ql - 2t e( )
ql 4qh - ql( )
ì!
í!
ï!
ï!
î!
ï!
ï!
 (4) 
All other things being equal, the emission tax te has two contradictory effects on 
demand: through its abatement subsidy component, it plays as a rise in the maximal 
ecological consciousness from q  to 
e
tq +
; through its maximal pollution taxation 
effect, it tends to depress demand for each product.
3
 The demand for the brown product 
remains thus positive as long as the relative taxation effect is sufficiently low in 
comparison with the abatement effort of the brown firm:  
 !
g e º
t e
q!+ t e
<
1
2
ql  (5) 
The taxation parameter 
 !
g e  measures the relative emission tax effect compared to the 
abatement subsidy effect of the emission taxation. Condition (5) is fulfilled when this 
parameter is less than half of the brown firm’s abatement effort. This implies that the 
emission tax 
 !
t e!is less than half the maximal willingness-to-pay for the brown quality, 
including abatement subsidy 
 !
q!+ te( )ql . 
3.2 The quality subgame 
In the first stage, firms decide on quality levels anticipating prices of the second 
stage. They also maximize the following profits, rewritten using equations (2), (3) and 
(4), with respect to qualities: 
 !
p h = qh - ql( )dh
2
-
c
2
qh
2
p l =
ql
qh
qh - ql( )dl
2
-
c
2
ql
2
ì!
í!
ï!
ï!
î!
ï!
ï!
 (6) 
The maximization conditions are: 
 !
¶p h
¶qh
=
2qh - g e( ) 4qh - 7ql( )g e + 8qh
2
- 6qhql + 4ql
2
( )
( )
q!
2
1- g e( )
2
4qh - ql( )
3
- cqh = 0
¶p l
¶ql
=
qh ql -2g e( ) 4qh - 7ql( )qhql + 8qh
2
- 6qhql + 4ql
2
( )
g e( )q!
2
1- g e( )
2
4qh - ql( )
3
ql
2
- cql = 0
ì!
í!
ï!
ï!
î!
ï!
ï!
 (7) 
In order to simplify these conditions, we operate a first variable substitution by 
denoting the differentiation index 
 !
l º qh
* ql
*  (with 
 !
l³1). Both conditions (7) induce the 
following equality: 
                                                        
3
 We can verify that introduction of a unit tax instead of an emission tax triggers only the second 
effect. 
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 !
2lql - ge( ) 4l - 7( )ge + 2 4l
2
- 3l + 2
( )
ql( )q!
2
=
ql -2ge( ) 4l - 7( )l + 2 4l
2
- 3l + 2
( )
ge( )l
2
 (8) 
Without emission tax, condition (8) equates to a polynomial function of degree three 
 !
4l3 - 23l2 +12l - 8 = 0  with only one real root greater than one, 2512.50 =l . By 
substituting l by l0 in one of the first order conditions (7), we obtain, as Motta (1993), 
the brown equilibrium quality 
 !
ql
*
= 0.0482q!2 c  and hence the green quality 
 !
qh
*
= l0ql
*.
4
 
The qualities offered to consumers are differentiated, rise with the maximal ecological 
sensitivity 
 !
q! and decrease with the slope of the marginal cost curve c. The equilibrium 
prices also grow with 
 !
q! and fall with c: 
 !
ph
*
= 0.1077q!3 c  and 
 !
pl
*
= 0.0102q!3 c . 
Demand increases with 
 !
q!: 
 !
dh
*
= 0.525q! and 
 !
dl
*
= 0.262q!.
5
 
When te is positive, we cannot analytically express the equilibrium qualities. We 
therefore turn to numerical simulations (see section 3.3) or carry out an ex post analysis 
of the equilibrium. With this aim, we operate a second variable substitution by 
expressing the taxation parameter 
 !
g e  in terms of a percentage r of the ex post 
equilibrium low quality 
 !
q l
*  (
 !
r º ge ql
* , with 
 !
rÎ 0, 1
2[ ]
). Since r is introduced into the 
analysis after the implicit determination of 
 !
qh
*  and 
 !
q l
*  in (7), it corresponds to a variable 
substitution and not to an endogenisation of 
 !
g e . Thanks to this variable substitution, the 
following proposition holds. 
Proposition 1. When the emission tax parameter 
 !
ge º te q!+ te( )
 is expressed in terms 
of a percentage r!of the ex post brown quality 
 !
q l
*  and 
 !
rÎ 0, 1
2[ ]
, the differentiation 
index 
 !
l º qh
* ql
*  is the only real root 
 !
l r
( )
 of the polynomial function 
 !
P l;r
( )
 defined 
by: 
 !
P l;r
( )
º 4 1- 4r2
( )
l
4
+ 12r2 + 8r -23
( )
l
3
+ 4 1+ r
( )
3-2r
( )
l
2
+4 r2 + 2r -2
( )
l + 4r - 7r2
 (9) 
— Please insert figure 1 — 
For each value of r,
 !
P l;r
( )
 has only one real root 
 !
l r
( )
 greater than unity (cf. figure 
1a). 
 !
l r
( )
 is a convex function which reaches a minimum at 
 !
l 0.06
( )
= 5.1731 and 
exceeds its initial value at 
 !
r = 0.13
!(cf. figure 1b).
6
 For each value of r, we thus 
compute the unique associated value 
 !
l r
( )
 and then substitute 
 !
l r
( )
ql
*  for 
 !
qh
*
 and 
 !
rql
*
 
for 
 !
g e  in the second optimality condition (7). We therefore deduce the proposition 2 
below. 
                                                        
4
 Motta (1993) proves that these qualities are indeed Nash equilibrium. 
5
 The market is indeed partly covered if 
 !
q £
˜ 
q!, so that 
 !
q! q > 4.706. Moreover, 
 !
ql
*
£ qh
*
£ 1 if 
 !
q!
2 c £1 0.2533» 3.95. 
6
 Calculations and simulations were made with the software Mathematica. It is impossible to express 
the form of this root simply. 
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Proposition 2. When the emission tax parameter 
 !
ge º te q!+ te( )
 is expressed in terms 
of a percentage r!of the ex post brown quality 
 !
q l
*  and 
 !
rÎ 0, 1
2[ ]
, the equilibrium brown 
quality 
 !
q l
* is implicitly defined by the following equation: 
 !
G ql
*;r
( )
º 1- rql
*
( )
2
ql
*
-f r
( )
q!
2
c
= 0  (10) 
with 
 !
f r
( )
=
1- 2r
( )
l r
( )
4.l r
( )
- 7
( )
l r
( )
+ 2 4l r
( )
2
- 3l r
( )
+1
( )
r
( )
4.l r
( )
-1
( )
3  (11) 
and the equilibrium green quality is defined as 
 !
qh
*
= l r
( )
ql
*.  
The polynomial function 
 !
G ql
*;r
( )
 increases in 
 !
q l
*
 and has only one real root 
 !
ql
*
r
( )
 
lower than unity, the expression of which is given in appendix A1 (cf. figure 1c).
7
 The 
brown quality 
 !
ql
*
r
( )
 increases with the tax parameter r and reaches its maximum at 
 !
ˆ 
r!= 0.07 (cf. figure 1d). Consequently, the green quality, defined by 
 !
qh
*
= l r
( )
ql
*, may 
increase or decrease with r!according to the relative importance of the contradictory 
effects of the differentiation index 
 !
l r
( )
 and the brown quality 
 !
ql
*
r
( )
. We show in 
appendix A1 that these qualities are the only stable solution of the quality game. 
Moreover, a simulation of both first order conditions, presented in appendix A2, shows 
that our methodology allows us to select the one stable equilibrium. Although the 
formulation of the game equilibrium set out in proposition 2 allows us to outline the 
effects of key parameters of the game on firms’ choices, only simulations enable us to 
study more thoroughly the implications of the emission tax on the game equilibrium. 
3.3 The consequences of an emission tax  
An analysis of the qualities at the game equilibrium is carried out by restricting the 
study to the duopoly case, in such a way that definition space of 
 !
t e becomes 
 !
0,t!e[ ].
8
  
— Please insert figure 2 — 
A tighter emission tax leads to an improvement in the brown quality 
 !
q l
*  when 
 !
t e  
remains lower than a given threshold 
 !
ˆ 
t!e, and to a deterioration beyond this threshold 
(figure 2a). This result is in line with the proposition 2: the maximal brown quality is 
obtained with a tax parameter 
 !
ˆ 
r!= 0.07 , which corresponds to an emission tax 
 !
ˆ 
t!e = 0.004  in our baseline scenario where 
 !
q! and c are equal to 1. Furthermore, a more 
stringent tax tends to enhance the high quality 
 !
qh
*
 (figure 2b). As a consequence, 
differentiation slightly decreases when 
 !
t e is low but noticeably increases with 
 !
t e for 
                                                        
7
 
 !
G 0;r
( )
= -f r
( )
q!
2 c < 0 while 
 !
f 0
( )
> 0 , 
 !
f r
( )
 is slightly increasing up to 
 !
f 0.06
( )
= 0.049, and 
then decreasing to zero for 
 !
r = 1 2 . 
8
 For 
 !
q!
 and c equal to 1, 
 !
t!e = 0.0085 . Obviously, this threshold rises with 
 !
q!
 (
 !
t!e = 0.0148  for 
 !
q!=1.2, 
 !
t!e = 0.0238  for 
 !
q!=1.4, 
 !
t!e = 0.0362  for 
 !
q!=1.6, 
 !
t!e = 0.0525  for 
 !
q!=1.8) and decreases with 
c. It corresponds to a tax parameter 
 !
r!= 0.18. 
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higher values. The differentiation index shape highlighted in the figure 1b corroborates 
this result: 
 !
l r
( )
 is minimum at 
 !
r = 0.06 such as 
 !
t e = 0.003 in our baseline scenario. 
A higher emission tax increases prices through its direct effect on production cost 
and its indirect impact on product differentiation. The deterioration of the quality 
 !
q l
* , 
beyond 
 !
ˆ 
t!e, however, acts  in the opposite direction. For both products, the former effect 
is stronger than the latter, in such a way that the higher 
 !
t e is, the higher prices will be 
(figure 2c and 2d).  
Higher emission taxation also tends to reduce demand for brown (figure 2e) and for 
green quality when 
 !
q! remains relatively low (figure 2f). Several variants on this 
parameter show that when 
 !
q! is sufficiently high, the demand for the green variant can 
grow with the tax (see appendix A4). In this case, the improvement of the green quality 
is due to a more stringent tax offsetting the price effect. Therefore, green demand 
follows a bell-shaped curve for medium 
 !
q! and a rising curve for higher 
 !
q!. 
As a consequence, the profit of the brown firm decreases with the emission tax, 
becoming equal to zero for the tax 
 !
t!e (figure 2g). By contrast, the profit of the green 
firm follows a U-shaped curve thanks to the higher quality of its product (figure 2h). As 
a result, a high pollution tax leads to a green product monopoly, for which the analysis 
is given in appendix A3.  
We have shown that a low emission tax enhances the quality of both products, and 
hence the quality of the environment, but increases product differentiation. The 
contradictory impacts of the tax on both market failures raise the question of its effects 
on social welfare.  
4. The second best optimum  
In accordance with the literature on environmental economics, we assume that global 
pollution generates environmental damage and this corresponds to a monetary valuation 
of the impact of pollution on society as a whole (Baumol and Oates, 1988). The welfare 
function is defined in the following way: 
  
W = CSh + CSl + ph + p l + GR - D  (12) 
with CSi the surplus of consumers purchasing the quality qi, pi the firm i’s profit (i=h,l), 
GR the tax revenue and D the environmental damage function. The damage is assumed 
to be linear with respect to total emissions E. Let d be the marginal environmental 
damage, the total damage is then defined by 
  
D=dE , with 
  
d ³0. We analyze the effects 
of the emission tax on each component of welfare before inferring its global impact. 
— Please insert figure 3 — 
The net surpluses of consumers of green and brown products are defined by: 
  
CSi = qqi - pi( )dq
q i
q i
ò
=
1
2
qidi q i +q i( )- pidi i = h,l  (13) 
with 
  
q l =
˜ 
q , 
  
q l = qh =
ˆ 
q  and 
  
q h = q . An increase in the emission tax raises the brown 
quality (below 
  
ˆ 
t e) and the green quality but it induces higher prices. Surplus of both 
types of consumers is reduced because the price effect outweighs the quality effect 
(figures 3a and 3b).  
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As shown previously, a brown firm’s profit decreases with the emission tax whereas 
a green firm’s profit follows a U-shaped curve. 
Pollution is defined by: 
  
E = 1- qh
*
( )
dh
*
+ 1- ql
*
( )
dl
*
=
q 
1- rql
*
3l - r 1+ 2l
( )
- l 2l +1- 3r
( )
ql
*
4l -1
( )
 (14) 
A rise in the emission tax tends to reduce pollution thanks to an improvement in the 
ecological quality of products and a drop in the total demand (figure 3c). Nevertheless, 
the tax revenue, defined by 
  
GR = t e E , grows with the tax (figure 3d).  
— Please insert figure 4 — 
The effects of the emission tax on global welfare are not a priori obvious. Welfare 
tends to grow with 
  
t e thanks to fiscal revenue supplement and pollution reduction, but 
the loss in consumers’ surpluses and firms’ profit act in the an opposite direction. For a 
very low marginal damage, welfare follows a concave curve where the maximum is 
reached for a tax 
  
t e
*
 lower than its maximal value 
  
t e (figure 4).
9
 If the marginal 
environmental damage is higher, welfare is a growing function of 
  
t e. The welfare is 
then maximal for the value 
  
t e. We indeed show in appendix A3 that green monopoly 
taxation is always welfare depressing. 
Studies of environmental tax in non-competitive markets underline that the second-
best optimum is reached with an emission tax lower than the marginal environmental 
damage. This result is generally verified in our framework. Obviously, when d  is higher 
than the maximal tax 
  
t e, the optimal tax is always lower than marginal damage. When 
d  is lower than the maximal tax 
  
t e, simulations with a range of values for 
  
q  show that 
the optimal tax remains lower than marginal damage when 
  
q  is not too high. For 
instance, when 
  
q  is normalized to 1, the optimal environmental tax is always lower 
than the marginal damage, whatever d may be (see footnote 9). However, a special case 
emerges when 
  
q  is higher than a threshold, denoted 
  
q :
10
 the fiscal revenue effect is 
then so great that the optimal environmental tax is positive even with a marginal 
damage equal to zero. As a consequence, an optimal tax higher than the small marginal 
damage may arise (cf. appendix A4). 
Proposition 3. The higher the marginal damage d is, the higher the second-best 
optimal emission tax 
  
t e
* will need to be. A marginal damage threshold 
  
d  and a 
ecological awareness threshold 
  
q  exist such that the optimal tax is lower than 
marginal damage if: 
(a) 
  
d > t e , then 
  
t e
*
£ t e < d 
 (b) 
  
d £ t e  and 
  
q £ q , then 
  
t e
*
< d £ t e 
                                                        
9
 In the baseline scenario, the welfare follows a concave curve if d ≤ 0.025 and the maximum is 
reached for te=0.002 (r = 0.04) if d = 0.01, te=0.007 (r = 0.14) if d = 0.02 and te=0.008 (r = 0.18) if d = 
0.025. 
10
 Our simulations show that 
  
q  is around 1.22 when c is equal to one. 
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 (c) 
  
d £ t e , 
  
q > q  and 
  
d ³ d , then 
  
t e
*
< d £ t e 
and the optimal tax is higher than the marginal damage if: 
(d) 
  
d £ t e , 
  
q > q  and 
  
d < d , then 
  
d £ t e
*
£ t e 
Beyond a certain marginal damage, the optimal tax reaches its maximal value 
  
t e . 
The most polluting firm is also ejected from the market and the less polluting firm 
becomes a green product monopolist. 
Thus an emission tax seems an efficient means to move the game equilibrium closer 
to the Pareto’s optimum. In most cases, the optimal tax is lower than marginal damage. 
This environmental policy can lead to a green monopoly. The optimal tax is then the 
one that induces a kind of limit price strategy for the green monopoly. 
5. Conclusion 
Since Pigou’s work, environmental tax has been considered as one of the most 
efficient environmental policies. In a competitive market, the optimal tax is equivalent 
to the marginal environmental damage and leads to a first best optimum. When polluters 
compete in a non-competitive market, the environmental tax generally remains an 
efficient instrument but the coexistence of two market failures for only one policy leads 
economists to advocate a tax that is less than the marginal damage. This tax allows the 
attainment of a second-best optimum.  
In our paper, we have examined a new non-competitive case:  
- environmental quality competition in green markets where consumers differ in 
their ecological consciousness, and thus in their willingness-to-pay for 
environmental quality; 
- and, polluting duopoly that compete both in price and the environmental quality 
of their products in a vertically differentiated market.  
Furthermore, we have focused on situations where the improvement of environmental 
quality requires R&D expenditure, and thus involves fixed costs. We have shown that 
an emission tax leads to a decrease in pollution, through an improvement in green, and, 
in some cases, brown quality. The tax is therefore successful at increasing overall 
welfare.  
The higher the marginal damage is, the higher the optimal tax will need to be. But 
the optimal tax is also less than the marginal damage when the market is not too large. 
In the case of relatively high marginal environmental damage, the optimal emission tax 
leads to the eviction of the brown product firm by giving an advantage to the green 
product firm. This is counter to a policy of higher competition between firms. In 
consequence, it may be advisable to introduce an economical policy to reduce the 
inefficiency caused by the monopoly power of the green firm. 
This paper completes the results from Lombardini-Riipinen (2005), who studies 
emission tax in the case of variable costs for quality improvement, and Moraga-
González and Padrón-Fumero (2002), who consider the effects of unit emission 
standards, technology subsidies and product tax in the case of fixed costs for quality 
improvement. In order to extend our analysis, it may be useful to provide some 
comparative statics of environmental quality, prices and welfare. This requires resolving 
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difficulties arising from the introduction of a variable cost in a product-differentiation 
model with fixed cost for quality. This will soon be subject to further research. 
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7.  Appendix 
A1. Conditions for existence of an equilibrium 
We study here the first order conditions (7) of the quality subgame. The first equation of conditions 
(7) decreases with qh: 
  
¶
2
p h
¶qh
2
= -
8 ql - 2g e( ) 2g e qh - ql( )+ ql - 2g e( )ql + 5qh - g e( )ql[ ]q 
2
1- g e( ) 4qh - ql( )
2
- c < 0  
as the first term in the numerator is positive and the term in brackets is positive. Moreover, 
  
¶ph ¶qh qh=0
= g e 4q ql - 7g e( ) ql
2
> 0  
when condition (5) is met. There is thus a solution 
  
qh
* ql( ) for the first equation (7) 
The second equation of conditions (7) increases for low values of ql and then decreases for large 
values of ql. (figure A1) The second derivative of firm l’s profit is:  
  
¶
2
p l
¶ql
2
= -
2qh 4 16qh
3
-16qh
2ql + 6qhql
2
- 3ql
3
( )
g e
2
- 4 5qh + ql( )ql
3
g e - 8qh + 7ql( )qhql
3
[ ]
q 
2
1- g e( ) 4qh - ql( )
2
ql
3
- c  
A solution exists if there is 
  
v > 0 such that
  
¶
2
p l v( ) ¶ql
2
= 0and 
  
¶p l v( ) ¶ql > 0. Some numerical 
simulations allow us to show that two equilibria are possible. However, the first one, with the lowest 
quality, is not stable because firm l’s profit increases for a quality slightly higher than this point. Only the 
second one is then a stable solution of the second condition (7). Nevertheless, the existence of an 
equilibrium requires a tax parameter lower than a threshold 
  
g e . This threshold is all the more high as the 
maximal marginal willingness to pay is high. For 
  
q 
=1 and c=1, the threshold 
  
g e  is equal 0.011. 
Simulations in subsection A2 show that our methodology for game resolution enables us to select the 
stable equilibrium. The expression of the low quality at equilibrium is given by: 
  
ql
*
=
2
3r
+
2
1
3
3r -2 + 27b + 3
1
2
b
1
2
-4 + 27b
( )
1
2
é 
ë 
ê 
ù 
û 
ú 
1
3
+
-2 + 27b + 3
1
2
b
1
2
-4 + 27b
( )
1
2
é 
ë 
ê 
ù 
û 
ú 
1
3
3.2
1
3.r
 with 
  
b = rf r
( )
q 
2
c
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(a) 
  
q 
=1  (b) 
  
q 
=2 
Figure A1. Simulation of 
  
¶p l ¶ql  for qh=0.25 
  
g e=0  (clear grey curve), 0.005  (dark grey curve) and 0.01  (black curve) 
 
A2. Simulations of the game equilibrium 
The assumption on the value of 
  
q 
 affects the scale of the equilibrium qualities, prices and profits: the 
higher 
  
q 
 is, the higher the qualities, the prices and the profits are. The assumptions on the values of c act 
in the opposite direction: the higher c is, the lower the qualities, the prices and the profits are. Without 
loss of generality in the analysis of the effects of the emission tax, all the model simulations are then 
made with the value 1 for 
  
q 
 and c.  
Tab. A1 Direct simulations of first order conditions 
te  0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 
ge  0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 
  
q l
*
 0.0482  0.0492 0.0492 0.0487 0.0472 
  
qh
*
 0.2533  0.2542 0.2549 0.2556 0.2562 
  
pl
*
 0.0102 0.0115 0.0126 0.0136 0.0144 
  
ph
*
 0.1077 0.1090 0.1106 0.1125 0.1146 
  
dl
*
 0.2625 0.2418 0.2210 0.1994 0.1754 
  
dh
*
 0.5250 0.5243 0.5233 0.5220 0.5202 
  
p l
*
 0.0015 0.0011 0.0007 0.0004 0.0001 
  
ph
*
 0.0244 0.0241 0.0238 0.0237 0.0237 
Tab. A2 Simulations of first order conditions with  
  
r º g e ql
*  
r 
0 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.18 
f(r) 
0.0482 0.0488 0.0488 0.0482 0.0459 
l0 5.2512 5.1837 5.1790 5.2419 5.4893 
ge 0 0.0020 0.0039 0.0059 0.0084 
  
q l
*
 0.0482  0.0490 0.0492 0.0487 0.0467 
  
qh
*
 0.2533  0.2542 0.2549 0.2556 0.2563 
  
pl
*
 0.0102 0.0114 0.0125 0.0135 0.0145 
  
ph
*
 0.1077 0.1090 0.1106 0.1124 0.1152 
  
dl
*
 0.2625 0.2421 0.2115 0.2007 0.1690 
  
dh
*
 0.5250 0.5243 0.5234 0.5221 0.5196 
  
p l
*
 0.0015 0.0011 0.0007 0.0004 0 
  
ph
*
 0.0244 0.0241 0.0238 0.0237 0.0237 
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A3. The monopoly case 
The emission tax can exclude the standard product firm from a green market. In that case, the green 
product monopoly faces demand 
  
dm = q - pm qm  and determines price and quality that maximize its 
profit: 
  
p m =
1
t v
pm -t e 1- qm( )( )q -
pm
qm
æ 
è 
ç 
ö 
ø 
÷ 
-
1
2
cqm
2
 
The optimal price is 
  
pm =
1
2
t e + q -t e( )qm[ ]. It’s an increasing function of quality if 
  
t e < q . 
Substituting the optimal price into the profit expression leads to the following profit equation: 
  
p m =
t e
2 1- qm( )
2
- 2q t e 1- qm( )+q 
2qm
2
4qm
-
1
2
cqm
2  
The optimal quality is then solution of the first order condition of profit maximization: 
  
4cqm
3
- q +t e( )
2
qm
2
+t e
2
= 0 or 
  
4cqm
3 1-g e( )
2
-q 
2qm
2
+q 
2
g e = 0 .  
Without emission tax, the monopoly produces the quality 
  
qm
0
= q 
2 4c . With a positive emission tax, the 
optimal green quality of the monopoly is then defined by: 
  
qm
*
=
bm
3
+
2
1
3
bm
2
3 -2bm
2
+ 27bmg e + 3
3
2
bmg e
1
2
-4bm
2
+ 27g e( )
1
2
é 
ë 
ê 
ù 
û 
ú 
1
3
+
-2bm
2
+ 27bmg e + 3
3
2
bmg e
1
2
-4bm
2
+ 27g e( )
1
2
é 
ë 
ê 
ù 
û 
ú 
1
3
3.2
1
3
 
with 
  
bm =
q 
2
4c 1- g e( )
2
.  
  
Figure A3. Monopoly’s quality and profit for 
  
q c = 1 
Some numerical simulations allow us to show that 
  
qm
*
 increases with ge until a given threshold and 
then decreases, the demand for green product and the monopoly’s profit decrease with ge. As a 
consequence, all components of welfare except government revenue tend to decrease with ge in such a 
way that the emission tax is welfare decreasing.  
A comparison between welfare levels in the duopoly case and in the monopoly case highlights that the 
optimal emission is the one that ousts the brown firm when marginal damage is sufficiently high. 
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Figure A4. Welfare for d = 0.01 
 
A4. Variations of 
  
q  
11 
  
q =1.4 
  
q =1.8 
 
Figure A5.7a Welfare for d=0.01 
 
Figure A5.7 Welfare for d=0.01 
 
                                                        
11
 Given the size of image files, only welfare results are reproduced here, but more results are 
available on request from the authors. 
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Figure 1. Optimality conditions of the quality game 
  
Figure 1a. P(l; r)=0 
(The more the curves are dark, the more r tends to 1/2) 
Figure 1b. Solutions of P(l; r)=0 
  
Figure 1c. 
  
G ql
*;r
( )
 with 
  
q 
2 c = 1 
(The more the curves are dark, the more r tends to 1/2) 
Figure 1d. Solutions of 
  
G ql
*;r
( )
 with 
  
q 
2 c = 1 
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Figure 2. The effects of an emission tax te (for 
  
q 
2 c = 1) 
  
Figure 2a Figure 2b 
  
Figure 2c Figure 2d 
  
Figure 2e Figure 2f 
  
Figure 2g Figure 2h 
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Figure 3. The effects of an emission tax on welfare components (for 
  
q 
2 c = 1) 
  
Figure 3a. Brown consumers’ surplus Figure 3b. Green consumers’ surplus 
  
Figure 3c. Pollution Figure 3d. Tax Revenue 
 
  
Figures 4. The global effect of an emission tax te on welfare (for 
  
q 
2 c = 1) 
  
Figure 4a. with d=0.01 Figure 4b. With d=0.02 
 
 
 
